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Abstract
Sport mega-events not only give rise to major economic and socio-cultural opportunities
for host cities and nations, but also arouse increased local, national and international
security concerns. This article, which focuses on the European Football Championships
2008 in Austria and Switzerland (Euro 2008), seeks to link business and security issues
associated with sport mega-events. More specifically, it sets out to investigate
the ‘interpretative flexibility’ — for purposes of security, branding and urban
entrepreneurialism — of two types of spatial enclosures, set up temporarily in the host
cities of the Euro 2008: UEFA fan zones and stadium security rings. Emphasis will be
placed on the building up and articulation of the successive layers of meaning of these
zones through various mechanisms of institutional learning and policy transfer. The
‘making’ of fan zones and stadium security rings will hence be positioned within a
complex field of agencies, driving forces and motivations in terms of business and
security, including a range of international processes and stipulations, as well as diverse
local and national predispositions and impulses.
Introduction
Sport mega-events such as the Olympic Games or the FIFA World Cup are global
spectacles that are often legitimized politically in terms of their potential benefits for
urban regeneration, tourism and international standing (Judd and Fainstein, 1999; Degen,
2004). For example, the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany is estimated to have resulted
in 5 million international visitors, 18 million entrants to city ‘fan zones’, a combined
global television audience of 26 billion and a boost to the national economy of US $12.5
billion (Harris, 2007).
However, as sport mega-events have expanded in recent decades, they have also faced
new kinds and levels of security threats. Aside from the terrorist attack on the Israeli team
at the 1972 Olympics, the post-9/11 context has required sport mega-events to establish
ever more expensive and sophisticated securitization strategies. Security expenditure for
the 2004 Athens Olympics was US $1.5 billion, more than double that of the 2000
Sydney Olympics (Samatas, 2007). The security bill for the 2008 Beijing Olympics —
although the Chinese government revealed no official figures — is widely believed to
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have topped the amount spent in Athens (Yu et al., 2009). Whilst the cost explosion in
security matters at sport mega-events is admittedly justified by the need to provide
risk-free Games for the athletes, the local population and the international visitors, it also
raises a series of important issues regarding the driving forces, modalities and long-term
implications of the massive security efforts surrounding such events.
These comments point towards two major areas of research: the study of sport
mega-events in terms of ‘place selling’ (Kearns and Philo, 1993) or ‘urban
entrepreneurialism’ (Harvey, 1989; Hall and Hubbard, 1998), and the investigation of the
risk, security and surveillance issues at these events (Samatas, 2007; Klauser, 2008;
Boyle and Haggerty, 2009; Giulianotti and Klauser, 2010).
Objectives
This article seeks to link ‘urban entrepreneurialism’ and security issues associated with
sport mega-events. My analysis also incorporates a third issue, the importance of which
has not yet been fully appreciated by scholars investigating the opportunities and
vulnerabilities of such events: branding and global corporate interests targeted at the host
cities of major sport tournaments. My study sets out to explore the fusing interests and
logics — in terms of urban entrepreneurialism, branding and security — shaping the
reconfiguration of urban public space in the eight host cities of the European Football
Championships 2008 in Austria and Switzerland (hereafter called Euro 2008). Host cities
of Euro 2008 were Basel, Berne, Geneva and Zurich in Switzerland and Innsbruck,
Klagenfurt, Salzburg and Vienna in Austria.
As shown elsewhere in more detail (Klauser, 2010), host cities of sport mega-events
powerfully exemplify the splintering of the contemporary urban environment into a wide
range of more or less hermetically enclosed and tightly controlled enclaves that are
supported by advanced surveillance technologies and increased numbers of security
personnel. In the case of Euro 2008, UEFA produced more than 15 kilometres of
tarpaulin to cover the most prominently positioned fences and demarcate a multitude of
access-controlled spatial entities, from stadiums to referee headquarters and from team
hotels to specifically designed fan zones for ‘public viewing’ (UEFA, 2008). In principle,
each of these examples of access control could provide the basis for a detailed, micro-
geographical analysis of the agencies and motivations underpinning the differentiations
of urban public space by fences, patrolling police agents, access-control installations,
surveillance devices, and so on. However, since it is not possible to give an exhaustive
interpretation here, the analysis that follows focuses on investigating the interests and
meanings — in terms of security, branding and urban entrepreneurialism — associated
with two types of spatial enclosures, set up temporarily in the Euro 2008 host cities:
UEFA fan zones and stadium security rings. Both fan zones and stadium security rings
powerfully exemplify the temporary imprint of Euro 2008 on urban public space:
• In each of the host cities of Euro 2008 at least one fan zone was officially organized
by UEFA. Here supporters of different nations could drink and party whilst watching
the matches on giant television screens. Clearly separated from their surroundings and
carefully planned, regulated and monitored, fan zones were in many ways treated like
stadiums, thus reconstituting public space as a stage of the event (Hagemann, 2008).
Spectator capacities varied from 40,000 in the host city of Basel and 60,000 in Geneva
to 80,000 in Vienna. Smaller fan zones were also set up in most other major Austrian
and Swiss cities. However, for the sake of consistency, this article deals only with the
official UEFA fan zones in the eight Euro 2008 host cities.
• Stadium security rings provide a second example of event-related restructuring of the
Euro 2008 host cities, subject to a variety of constraints and stipulations. Up to several
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hundred metres from the stadium, depending on the city, stadium security rings
constituted the first fenced barrier to the stadium for arriving fan groups. Restricted to
holders of match tickets, accredited staff, members of the press and other authorized
persons, the compound area was closed to the general public for the whole duration of
Euro 2008.
Approach
My study of the meanings and interests associated with fan zones and stadium security
rings is based on two main conceptual ‘tools’, each of which I now outline briefly.
Interpretative ﬂexibility of the event-city
First, my study centres on the concept of ‘interpretative flexibility’, as developed in the
field of sociology of (scientific) knowledge (Pinch and Bijker, 1984). This concept,
defined as the ability of technological artefacts to ‘represent different things to different
actors’ (Law and Callon, 1992: 24), has in recent years been applied to a wide range of
phenomena, thus stressing that socio-technical ensembles have different layers of
meaning for different groups, as defined by the groups’ needs, intentions and expertise
(Doherty et al., 2006).
In the case at hand, I suggest scrutinizing the intersecting meanings associated with
fan zones and stadium security rings by three key players: UEFA, local political
authorities and the police. Thus, the study that follows is structured into three main parts.
The first part focuses on the meaning of fan zones and stadium security rings for
branding purposes by UEFA and its official event sponsors. This discussion not only
underlines the business rationale associated with the two types of spatial enclosure, but
also provides an initial reading of some of the mechanisms through which UEFA and its
tournament specifications prescribed the making of fan zones and stadium security
zones. The second part further investigates the business relevance of fan zones and
stadium security rings by addressing their meaning for local policymakers in terms of
place selling and urban entrepreneurialism. Finally, the third part of the article explores
the meaning of fan zones and stadium security rings for security and crowd-control
purposes.
I am aware that this focus does not provide an exhaustive interpretation of all the
factors and agents involved in the staging and securitization of Euro 2008. However, I
believe that this initial categorization constitutes a useful heuristic for advancing a
number of preliminary insights into the interwoven business and security rationales
underpinning the restructuring of the eight host cities of the event.
My investigation into the concept of interpretative flexibility also pays close attention
to the existence of coercive stipulations pushing towards the creation of fan zones and
stadium security rings. Indeed, we will see that from the bidding stage for the event, fan
zones and stadium security rings were part of a legally imposed ‘institutional agenda’
(Cobb and Elder, 1975) set externally by UEFA. However, if we want to understand the
actual implantation and functioning of fan zones and stadium rings, such is my main
assumption, these zones cannot be reduced to a single meaning assigned by a single
actor, but must be understood as the expression of processes involving a range of actors,
guided by common goals, acting from mutually enhanced positions and driven by
converging benefits, whilst also pursuing their own specific agendas and projects.
Policy learning
Secondly, drawing upon literatures in ‘policy learning’, ‘lesson drawing’ and ‘diffusion
of innovations’ in the field of comparative policy analysis (Rose, 1991; Bennett and
Howlett, 1992), the article portrays the ‘making’ (Latour, 1987) of fan zones and stadium
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security rings as a complex process of ‘institutional learning’ (Peck and Theodore, 2001),
which draws upon experiences from previous events. Indeed, as Schulke (2006) has
shown, the actual breakthrough of the fan-zone concept occurred two years prior to Euro
2008, at the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany, marking a clear change in the large-scale
restructuring of host cities into spatially extended public viewing areas. The organization
of such zones has since become one of the bid requirements for both the FIFA World Cup
and the European Football Championships (UEFA, no date) — a matter that will be
explored later in this article.
In summary, based on the two concepts of ‘interpretative flexibility’ and ‘institutional
learning’, this article sets out to highlight not only the capacity of fan zones and stadium
security rings to enrol disparate groups, interests and needs, but also the transnational
exchanges and policy learning processes leading to the articulation of successive layers
of meaning of these zones for business and security purposes. Based on this, the article
concludes by pointing towards some of the main issues involved in the establishment of
internationally calibrated, globally circulating best-practice models for multiple
(branding, place selling and security) purposes.
Methodology
To address these issues, the article draws upon empirical insights provided by a two-year
research project relating to the securitization of Euro 2008. In the context of this study,
two methodological approaches were combined. One side of the project relied on the
analysis of official reports (minutes of local executive and parliament sittings, executive
responses to interpellations and official documents from police sources or UEFA) and on
information gathered from various local, national and international media articles. The
other side involved ten in-depth interviews with diverse stakeholders in the securitization
of Euro 2008 in the Swiss city of Geneva. Interviewees were chosen according to their
roles and responsibilities, in order to generate a broad view of the implications of local
security operations for Euro 2008. The security stakeholders who were interviewed
included the city’s security coordinator, the head of security at the Euro 2008 stadium in
Geneva, security personnel at Geneva international airport, representatives from the
Ministry of Justice in Geneva (chancellerie) and police ground personnel.
Branding the event-cities of Euro 2008
The European Football Championships are generally regarded as the third largest
recurrent sport event in the world (Stadtpolizei Zürich, 2007). The event presents
important analogies to the FIFA World Cup in that it affects several host cities (unlike
the Olympic Games), evokes similar concern in terms of hooliganism and crowd
management and results in a comparable cluster of spatial enclosures across the host
cities. Although restricted to national football teams from Europe (with the exception
of Israel, if its team qualifies), the event is clearly global in scope and scale: an
estimated 10 million spectators and fans gathered between 7 and 29 June 2008 in the
eight host cities of Euro 2008 (Projektorganisation, 2008: 12). Football matches were
broadcast in 231 countries worldwide and were followed by 155 million television
viewers per game on average (ibid.). In Austria and Switzerland, around 10,000 media
representatives and journalists were accredited during the event (ibid.). Thus, based on
the scale of media interest (Roche, 2000), there are valid reasons for interpreting Euro
2008 as a truly global sport mega-event with major business and branding
opportunities. It is from this standpoint that I seek to highlight the branding interests
of UEFA (and its event sponsors) that are associated with the staging of fan zones and
stadium security rings.
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The branding rationale of UEFA fan zones
UEFA fan zones appealed to the general public for various reasons. As pointed out by the
UEFA tournament requirements, ‘the core element of each fan zone . . . is the live
screening of all . . . matches in a public viewing environment which is designed to be
open for the entire event and free of charge for visitors’ (UEFA, no date: 77). Besides the
live transmission of football matches on large screens, the zones also staged concerts and
other entertainment activities, whilst offering a range of catering facilities and other
attractions.
For UEFA, the appeal of fan zones was related directly to branding purposes. This
claim is best investigated through a review of some of the legal means employed by
UEFA in creating a patchwork of ‘clean sites’ (UEFA, no date: 44) across the event-cities
for its official partners’ advertisement and merchandise to be displayed. This
investigation reveals the external stipulations underpinning the hosting of sport mega-
events, which push towards the reproduction of previously tested and subsequently
standardized best-practice models. It is informative to start this discussion by looking at
the pre-bidding stage of Euro 2008.
In 2002, as a precondition for their bid for Euro 2008, the Austrian and Swiss
governments and football associations were required to provide a series of guarantees
relating to a wide range of issues. These included provision of event security, the
protection of UEFA’s commercial rights, promotional activities, granting of visas and
work permits and the free importation of goods listed in UEFA’s Schedule of Conditions
(Projektorganisation, 2008: 100–05). The guarantees did not specify explicitly the
organization of fan zones and stadium security zones, but did establish their guiding
principles (security and exclusive branding rights).
At this pre-bidding stage, UEFA’s Schedule of Conditions also provided potential
bidders with detailed documentation regarding the requirements. Whilst the Schedule of
Conditions for Euro 2008 can be approached only indirectly through the study of
parliamentary protocols and minutes of executive meetings, UEFA’s bid requirements
for Euro 2012 can be found on the official UEFA webpage. This document emphasizes
the meaning of fan zones and their meaning for branding purposes:
The concept of a Fan Zone is to create an area that is accessible to the general public in which
UEFA’s Commercial Partners can stage a variety of UEFA EURO 2012-related activities,
entertainment and displays. The Fan Zone(s) will provide certain Commercial Partners with an
additional opportunity to leverage off their commercial involvement in UEFA EURO 2012. It
is also intended the Fan Zones will become attractions in their own right and, as such, will
increase the number of people (both from the Host Country and elsewhere) who will have
direct involvement in, and exposure to, UEFA Euro 2012 (UEFA, no date: 45).
The quote not only underscores UEFA’s branding interest in the event-cities, but also
hints at the exemplification of fan zones as a best-practice model, prescribed to potential
hosts of the event in UEFA’s pre-bidding Schedule of Conditions. Thus, the meaning of
fan zones for branding purposes was imposed from the very start, without taking into
account any particular local characteristics, such as legal issues arising from the
temporary privatization of public space.
Following UEFA’s decision to award EURO 2008 to Switzerland and Austria, the
initial framework of pre-bidding guarantees and event specifications was further refined,
and by January 2007 a collection of detailed terms and conditions, named the Host City
Charter, had been elaborated between UEFA and the eight host cities. The charter
specified the mutual rights and duties of the main event stakeholders, as well as the
infrastructure that was to be put in place. Whilst the liability implications of UEFA’s
pre-bidding Schedule of Conditions had raised some debate in Switzerland and Austria
(Arpagaus, 2008), the Host City Charter gave the meaning of fan zones for branding
purposes legally binding recognition:
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Each host city is responsible for planning, organizing and putting into effect one or several fan
zones, situated in an appropriate and highly frequented zone of the city . . . UEFA sponsors
enjoy exclusive advertisement rights within these sites (UEFA Host City Charter Euro 2008,
cited in République et Canton de Genève, 2007; author’s translation).
This quote again testifies to the meaning of fan zones as ‘clean sites’ (UEFA, no date: 44)
for advertisement by UEFA’s official partners: each site had to be made available to
UEFA free of any contractual obligations (such as leases, utilization agreements, supplier
agreements, food, beverage agreements, and so forth) and pre-contracted advertising, in
order to allow the site’s re-territorialization by UEFA and its official sponsors.
Furthermore, the quote also reveals the contractually imposed location of fan zones in
highly frequented and well-connected areas of the host cities.
Branding and stadium security rings
An almost identical interpretation can be made of the meaning of stadium security rings.
It is revealing that in UEFA’s Schedule of Conditions for Euro 2012, stadium security
rings are also named ‘fan zones’:
Each Stadium must have a minimum of 1,000 m2 inside the Stadium Perimeter that can be
made available to Commercial Partners for the creation of “fan zones” where they can display
their products and entertain spectators with interactive activities. In order to ensure the
maximum exposure for Commercial Partners and maximum spectator enjoyment, such fan
zones must be located in close proximity to the Stadia on or adjacent to significant spectator
access routes (UEFA, no date: 22).
Despite being restricted to holders of match tickets, security zones surrounding the
stadiums provide a second context within which to consider the branding rationale
underlying the partitioning of the event-cities into a series of more or less hermetically
enclosed spatial entities.
In summary, for UEFA, fan zones and stadium security rings served to temporarily
re-territorialize particularly attractive parts of the Euro 2008 host cities in the interest of
visibility and branding for its commercial partners. From the outset, the partitioning of
the urban environment stood in a specific set of relationships to the city, mediated
through UEFA’s intentions to create a ‘clean environment’ for its official partners’
branding and merchandise.
Urban entrepreneurialism
My analysis has so far explored the externally driven, commercially motivated impetus
for setting up fan zones and stadium security rings. By means of a form of ‘policy
convergence through penetration’ (Bennett, 1991), mediated by pre-bidding guarantees,
tournament specifications and the Host City Charter, UEFA ensured that from the very
start of the bidding process for Euro 2008, fan zones and stadium security rings conveyed
a meaning of ‘exclusive disposal and branding’.
Yet it is important to consider the role of local agency and motivation too. Fan zones
were not only imposed externally, but also adopted locally. At this stage, ‘interpretative
flexibility’ comes into play. It is to this issue that I shall turn my attention in the section
that follows, exploring the meaning of fan zones for local policymakers.
Resonating business interests in the organization of fan zones
For local policymakers, fan zones were understood, and eagerly put into effect, as a
means for city marketing and place selling (Philo and Kearns, 1993). These two accounts
substantiate this claim:
6
Knowing that these zones make up for a large part of the fascination of such
tournaments, . . . the city council will ensure that during Euro 2008, a diverse and attractive
range of events with live transmission on large screens will be offered . . . As highlighted by the
2006 World Cup, there is an opportunity here for host cities to present themselves in their best
light both nationally and internationally (Stadtrat Zürich, 2006a: 6–7; author’s translation).
It is part of the city’s mandate to distinguish itself as a host city through the creation of its own
individuality and character. This distinction essentially results from a colourful intercultural
and diverse supporting programme (Stadtrat Zürich, 2006b: 29; author’s translation).
Both quotations highlight the aspiration of policymakers not only to comply with
UEFA’s stipulations in staging fan zones, but also to take the opportunity to set up a truly
distinguishing range of events with a view to enhancing the city’s national and
international profile. I have included these quotations here for three main reasons. First,
they highlight the locally perceived benefits and assigned meaning, and hence the
interpretative flexibility, of fan zones. Secondly, they testify to the merging interests
between UEFA and policymakers, or, in other words, to the resonance between UEFA’s
external stipulations and local motivations in terms of place selling and urban
entrepreneurialism. Thirdly, they underscore the need to move beyond an understanding
of local stakeholders at sport mega-events as passive recipients of authoritative orders
imposed from the outside.
Although the staging of fan zones was prescribed by UEFA, we must also take into
account other kinds of meanings, defined by other actors, perspectives, needs and
interests if we are to understand the actual implantation, functioning and implications of
these zones (for example, the organization of events in these sites). As the example
shows, it is important that we orient our study towards the socio-political dynamics
unfolding locally as a result of the perceived benefits of the restructured event-city.
Conﬂicting interests in global branding and city marketing
Despite fusing interests in fan zones, however, the positions of UEFA and local
policymakers also differed in important ways. For UEFA, the creation of ‘clean sites’
across the host cities was based on de-territorialized interest in the event as a brand. For
local policymakers, the business relevance of fan zones was related to a specific city to
be promoted. Whilst UEFA, ultimately, was driven by global corporate interests, local
policymakers aimed at maximizing place-related business benefits. The latter’s position,
although sympathetic to the festivalization of urban public space, was caught somewhat
uncomfortably between UEFA’s efforts to enhance exclusive branding in the
re-territorialized event-city, and the claims of ownership by local businesses:
EURO 2008 did not only take place in the football stadia, but also occupied large public areas
in the host cities. Regarding the rights of sponsors and brands, and copyright matters, this leads
to inevitable conflicts of interest with those who were already occupying these areas or wanted
to profit from the ‘football’ product. With the signing of guarantees, especially those protecting
UEFA’s commercial rights and those of its sponsors, we were hardly aware of the potential
consequences. The legal situation is still unclear and the subject is totally controversial and
media-bound (Overall Project Coordination Swiss Authorities, 2008: 6).
This quotation is a striking testimony to the conflicts of interest between UEFA and those
who previously occupied the areas that became defined and enclosed as fan zones. It also
highlights the controversies that unfolded from the implantation of fan zones. Although
these controversies were suspended temporarily with the Host City Charter, giving
UEFA’s claims binding recognition for the duration of Euro 2008, the legal issues arising
from UEFA’s temporary appropriation of urban public space remained unclear. For
future research in urban entrepreneurialism and sport mega-events, it will be of major
interest to explore the subsequent turns of this debate both in Switzerland and in other
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national contexts in which similar events will be staged. However, for the moment we
return to the article’s concern with the ‘interpretative flexibility’ of fan zones.
Indeed, the example at hand also tells us something about the meanings, values and
aspirations associated with the spatial reconfiguration of the event-city. Fan zones are not
to be understood simply as the outcome of a generalized fusion of interests but, rather,
must be positioned within a complex field of agencies, driving forces, motivations and
understandings, including a range of international interests and stipulations, as well as a
series of converging and diverging national and local predispositions and impulses. If we
are to understand the processes and relationships underpinning the staging of fan zones,
the tensions and frictions arising from a globally calibrated model that is imposed in a
specific local context must also be recognized. This supposition can be further refined by
looking in more detail at fan zones in terms of risk and security.
Spaces of risk and security at Euro 2008
From a risk and security perspective, based on the interviews conducted and reports
studied, two broad understandings of fan zones and stadium security rings can be
distinguished.
On the one hand, the two forms of spatial enclosure were approached and portrayed
as specific ‘places at risk’ and as areas representing heightened security concerns. A
reading of The National Swiss Security Strategy for Euro 2008 reveals the multifaceted
terrorist threats associated with both zones (Public Authorities Security Sector, 2007).
However, owing to their high degree of public accessibility, risks of spectator and
political violence were related almost exclusively to fan zones and not to stadium
security rings. Securing these publicly accessible places at risk thus became one of the
main focal issues for police forces, as well as for other risk-prevention agencies such as
fire brigades, medical staff and private security services.
On the other hand, fan zones and stadium security rings were understood to be
‘security elements’ in their own right. The following account is particularly relevant to
this article, for it not only emphasizes the interpretative flexibility of fan zones, but also
hints at the transfer of the zones as security elements from event to event:
The public viewing events which took place on an as yet unprecedented scale at the 2006 FIFA
World Cup in Germany were of outstanding importance for the safety and security of the
overall championship. The public viewing not only eased the strain on the police and forces of
order in and around the stadia, but also made a decisive contribution to the successful
interaction between safety and security, on the one hand, and the fulfilment of the World Cup
motto ‘A time to make friends’, on the other . . . Public viewing events should therefore also be
perceived as a preventive security element at large-scale international sporting and related
events and implemented as such . . . Experiences of both the 2006 FIFA World Cup and UEFA
Euro 2004 in Portugal have been incorporated into the present National Security Strategy for
Euro 2008 in terms of ‘best practice’ (Public Authorities Security Sector, 2007: 17).
In the light of the above quotation, we see that fan zones were understood not only as a
means for branding and urban entrepreneurialism, as shown previously, but also adopted
as a locus, medium and tool for event security. Fan zones eased the strain on the security
forces in and around the stadia, allowing the concentration, monitoring and regulation of
fans at specifically designed, enclosed and secured perimeters across host cities. Special
norms and constraints in the fan zones (including spot-checks of onlookers and special
regulations), monitored by temporarily installed CCTV cameras and patrolled by public
and private security agents, allowed the securitization of particular portions of space,
while other urban areas remained less considered. Thus, fan zones not only bear striking
testimony to the event-related ‘festivalization’ of urban public space (Häussermann and
Siebel, 1993), but also provide an illuminating example of the separation, fencing and
surveillance of extended parts of Swiss and Austrian city centres during Euro 2008. The
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UEFA fan zone in Vienna, for example, which covered more than 100,000 m2 of the city
centre, was surrounded by more than four kilometres of fencing (Vienna Organizing
Committee EURO 2008, 2008). Other host cities erected fencing of similar proportions.
A similar interpretation can be made of stadium security rings, as a second example
of the translation of event security onto the level of urban territory, following the need to
manage a context of increased density and risk. Both zones bear material testimony to the
internal fragmentation of the host cities of Euro 2008 into a patchwork of access-
controlled and monitored spatial entities. Fences around these zones not only created an
exclusive perimeter for UEFA’s commercial partners, but also separated and marked out
specific loci of increased securitization and surveillance.
The quotation above also points at the subsequent learning processes pertaining to the
meaning of the zones for security purposes. Indeed, if we are to understand the
interpretative flexibility of fan zones and stadium security rings, we need to move beyond
an exclusive understanding of these zones as legally and externally imposed best-practice
models, and look in more detail into the multiple channels and interactions in the model’s
transfer to, and re-articulation in, the host cities of Euro 2008. It is not possible to provide
an exhaustive analysis of this issue (that will be the subject of a separate work — see
Klauser, forthcoming). In the remainder of this article, my aim is simply to provide a few
preliminary insights into some of the mechanisms and channels mediating the making of
the security rationale for fan zones.
Previous practical experiences
Shortly after Euro 2008 was awarded to Austria and Switzerland, various mechanisms
were put in place for security stakeholders to learn about the meaning and functioning of
fan zones for security purposes. Most notably, many of the key stakeholders in event
security at Euro 2008 were already involved in, or at least present at, the 2006 FIFA
World Cup in Germany. Stakeholders, having gained initial awareness of the security
relevance of fan zones, could therefore draw a first series of lessons from previous
experience and integrate these into the project planning for Euro 2008.
Project leaders in the police department had already gained important experiences from local
security at the Football World Cup 2006 in Germany. Impressions from visits to the games and
to public viewing events in Stuttgart and Munich, as well as the results of coordinated
evaluations from project leaders, strongly influenced our own project planning (Stadtpolizei
Zürich, 2007; author’s translation).
Thus, fan zones were not only imposed legally, but also transferred practically. The
learning processes leading to the implementation of fan zones as a tool and locus for
event security had begun long before the establishment of the Host City Charter. While
the legal framework underlying the implementation of fan zones was established by
UEFA, the first steps towards the practical policy transfer for fan zones relied on the
mediating role of the German police, whose position as a ‘connector’ (Latour, 2005: 239)
was defined by its practical experience of, and coordinating position in, previous event
security. As the security coordinator of the Geneva football stadium stated:
When I went to Stuttgart, I was not in contact with my colleague from stadium security. I was
with the police. I’ve visited external fan zones, the stadium and its computer system, but
not with my counterparts from stadium security . . . Anyway, I saw what I had to see (interview
with security coordinator, Geneva football stadium, 14 February 2008; author’s translation).
Conferences and workshops
From these early exchanges and experiences, initial ties of collaboration developed,
linking security professionals in charge of different events. Subsequently, step by step,
additional opportunities arose for the various stakeholders to meet and interact,
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constituting another series of mediating moments of policy transfer for the fan-zone
model. In interviews, police and stadium personnel who were involved in the
securitization of Euro 2008 in Geneva repeatedly emphasized the importance of
workshops, expert conferences and other types of gatherings.
Exercises and assessments
Whilst such meetings allowed the establishment and modulation of networks of expertise
underpinning policy transfer for fan zones, the specific practices developed from an
understanding of the model in security terms also had to be exercised and
institutionalized. In Switzerland and Austria, a wide range of individual and collective
training sessions and exercises were organized before Euro 2008 (these also, although
not exclusively, related to the staging of fan zones and stadium security rings). Based on
the need to deal with the medium created by the model, this chain of practical
preparations consisted of various steps, according to different levels across the hierarchy
of actors involved:
Preparations were finalized in an exercise held in two public places, the Plainpalais fan zone
and the Bout-du-Monde fan village. Police forces were able to work with 50 mock fans in order
to train reactions to diverse threats. In the Plainpalais fan zone, which had a capacity for up to
45,000 people, security forces prepared for three scenarios: the removal of unruly fan groups,
the removal of unruly individuals and the control of a specific risk zone. The second part of the
exercise was carried out in the Bout-du-Monde fan village, where 30,000 spectators are
expected, and more than 3,000 fans are likely to be accommodated. At this location, therefore,
staff received training specific to the issues of camping and accommodation zones.
Local, national and international media also followed the exercises (Schweizerische
Kriminalprävention, 2008; author’s translation).
At least two major points stand out from the media report above in terms of this study’s
concern with interpretative flexibility and policy learning regarding fan zones. First, it
illustrates the role of exercises for the ‘articulation’ (Latour, 1999: 142) in situ of the
twofold security meaning of fan zones, as both ‘places at risk’ and as ‘security elements’
in their own right. Albeit temporarily, risk issues associated with, and security practices
developing from, fan zones could be tested in and adapted to the socio-spatial attributes
of the planned urban site of implantation. In short, the objective of the exercise was to
render the model in its twofold security meaning practically ‘inhabitable’ in its chosen
urban context.
Secondly, the reference to media representatives and other spectators assisting in the
exercise touches upon another key issue in the making of and policy transfer for fan
zones, namely the role of external agents and institutions in the development of the
meanings and functions of the zones (these agents and institutions included local
residents, media representatives, experts in mega-event security, and so forth). Thus,
specific ‘best-practice models’ are not only legally prescribed and practically transferred
from place to place and from event to event, but also followed, commented upon and
assessed, both formally and informally, by a wide range of external agents and
institutions. A study of the interpretative flexibility of fan zones must also focus on these
comments, judgements and assessments, as yet another set of mediating mechanisms
enrolling and carrying along disparate groups, interests and needs associated with the
restructured event-city.
Conclusions
This article has shown how Euro 2008 stakeholders have filled fan zones and stadium
security rings with different meanings, as defined by their own needs and interests, and
how these layers of meaning have been built up through multiple mechanisms, from
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pre-bidding guarantees to the Host City Charter and from expert conferences to practical
exercises. Admittedly, this study does not provide anything more than an initial sketch of
some of the mediating mechanisms in the making of fan zones and stadium security
rings. Many other mechanisms, from debriefing sessions to internal and external
evaluation reports or technology fairs, would have to be considered to complete the
picture that is emerging here. Nonetheless, my study, which is centered on the concepts
of ‘interpretative flexibility’ and ‘policy learning’, provides crucial insight into the logics
and motivations shaping the establishment of fan zones and stadium security rings as
legally imposed, practically transferred and locally adopted models of spatial enclosure,
related to purposes of branding, place selling and security. By way of conclusion, it is
worth reiterating three key lessons deriving from this study.
The first key lesson to highlight refers back to my account of UEFA’s efforts and legal
stipulations pushing towards the staging of fan zones and stadium security rings as a
means to enhance its branding opportunities across the host cities. For local and national
policymakers, the question ceased to be whether, but how, fan zones were to be set up
during Euro 2008. On the one hand, this issue directs attention towards the transnational
circuits of imitation and exemplification that characterize the staging of highly visible
projects such as sport mega-events. On the other hand, there are valid reasons for taking
this account as a starting point for considering the pressures and problems arising locally
from the imposed replication of globally circulating models shaped by private business
interests, which restrict not only the autonomy of local decision makers but also the
possibility and scope for real democratic debate. As the relevant parliamentary
commission in Basel, one of the Euro 2008 host cities, put it:
The JSSK [Commission for Justice, Security and Sport] can but conclude that the scope of
action of local parliaments as regards Euro 2008 is considerably restricted . . . The fact that
cantonal authorities should agree to provide financial support, when in reality they are not
really able to influence essential elements must be considered highly questionable (Grosser Rat
des Kantons Basel, 2007: 3; author’s translation).
The second key lesson of my study indicates the need to move beyond an
understanding of fan zones and stadium security rings as legally imposed means for
branding purposes, and to look in more detail into the interpretative flexibility and policy
transfer for the two models of spatial enclosure. This article has shown that local
policymakers both understood and eagerly put into effect fan zones and stadium security
rings as a means for city marketing and place selling. Furthermore, this study has brought
to the fore the meaning of such zones as a locus, medium and tool for event security,
hence exemplifying the intimate relationship between opportunities and vulnerabilities
associated with urban public space at sport mega-events. Together, the perspectives of
policymakers and police underscore the fact that fan zones and stadium security rings,
although imposed externally, were also adopted locally. If we are to understand the actual
implantation, functioning and implications of the enclosed perimeters (for example,
organization of events in specific fan zones), we must take into account their multiple
meanings, as defined by multiple actors, perspectives, needs and interests. Therefore we
must also consider the complex socio-political dynamics unfolding locally from the
perceived benefits of the restructured event-city.
The third key lesson of this article follows on from the above. This article not only
points out current trends of transnational imitation and standardization in the staging of
sport mega-events, but also highlights that local stakeholders at such events should not be
understood merely as passive recipients of authoritative orders imposed from the outside.
My study has paid attention not only to the resonating concerns, fusing interests,
converging goals and shared benefits amongst the studied stakeholders, but also — albeit
to a lesser degree — to the tensions and dilemmas arising from the ways in which fan
zones and stadium security rings were framed, approached and exploited by particular
actors and for particular needs. In particular, the article has pointed towards the
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unresolved conflict of interests arising between UEFA and those previously occupying
the enclosed city squares. As the final report of Euro 2008 in Switzerland argues, ‘these
legal-political issues need to be clarified with respect to future candidacies for major
sporting events’; it does admit, however, that this will be possible only ‘as far as the
competitive situation of a candidacy proposal permits’ (Overall Project Coordination
Swiss Authorities, 2008: 6).
It will be interesting to follow this controversy over time, both in Switzerland and
Austria and in future host nations of the European Football Championships. However,
precisely because of the model’s high capacity to respond not only to a single,
predominant intention (for example, UEFA’s branding attempt), but also to enrol other
actors, meanings and aspirations (for example, urban entrepreneurialism and security),
there is to date little reason to believe that the model — and hence UEFA’s claim to the
establishment of ‘clean sites’ across the host cities — will be truly challenged at future
events. A look at the recent 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa, at which an identical
arrangement for fan zones could be found (Haferburg et al., 2009), confirms this reading.
The speculative hypothesis to put forth here thus rather takes the opposite direction,
postulating that fan zones indeed become the ‘norm to follow’, not only in the context of
sport mega-events, but for the collection of larger or smaller numbers of individuals into
spatially articulated conglomerates of togetherness more generally.
Francisco R. Klauser (Francisco.klauser@unine.ch), Institut de Géographie, Université de
Neuchâtel, Espace Louis-Agassiz 1, 2000 Neuchâtel, Switzerland.
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Résumé
Les méga-évènements sportifs offrent des possibilités économiques et socio-culturelles
considérables pour les villes et pays d’accueil, mais ils accentuent aussi les
problématiques de sécurité locales, nationales et internationales. En s’intéressant à
l’Euro 2008 de football qui s’est tenu en Autriche et en Suisse, cet article relie les enjeux
économiques et sécuritaires associés à ce genre d’événement. Plus particulièrement, il
étudie la ‘flexibilité interprétative’ — en termes de sécurité, de stratégie de marque et
d’entrepreneurialisme urbain — propre à deux types de cadres spatiaux créés
temporairement dans les villes d’accueil de l’Euro 2008: les UEFA Fan Zones et les
périmètres de sécurité des stades. Le but est d’examiner la superposition et l’articulation
des différents niveaux de signification de ces zones à travers plusieurs mécanismes
d’apprentissage institutionnel et de transfert d’action publique. La ‘fabrication’des Fan
Zones et des périmètres de sécurité des stades sera donc replacée dans un cadre
complexe d’agences, de dynamiques et de motivations en matière d’activité économique
et de sécurité, révélant ainsi toute une série de conditions et de processus internationaux,
ainsi que différentes prédispositions et initiatives d’ordre local et national.
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